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The unprecedented epizootic of avian influenza a (h5n1) viruses among birds continues to cause human disease with high mortality and to pose the threat of a pandemic. This review updates a 2005 report1 and incor-
porates information recently published or presented at the Second World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) Consultation on Clinical Aspects of Human Infection with Avian 
Influenza A (H5N1) Virus.2 
V ir a l Ecol o gy
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses are entrenched among poultry 
in parts of Asia, Africa, and perhaps the Middle East. The highly pathogenic avian 
influenza H5 hemagglutinin has evolved into many phylogenetically distinct clades 
and subclades (Fig. 1)4,5 that generally correlate with antigenic differences that must 
be considered in the selection of candidates for H5N1 vaccines.6,7 These diverse lin-
eages have been largely separate geographically since 2005 (Fig. 1),5 although clade 
2.3 viruses from China have recently circulated in other Southeast Asian countries.8
The influenza A (H5N1) viruses that have infected humans have been entirely 
avian in origin, and they reflect strains circulating locally among poultry and wild 
birds. Avian influenza viruses can be maintained, amplified, and disseminated in 
live-poultry markets. Migratory birds may spread A (H5N1) viruses to new geo-
graphic regions, but their importance as an ecologic reservoir is uncertain. The 
spread of influenza A (H5N1) viruses appears to be principally related to the move-
ment of poultry and poultry products,9,10 although recent outbreaks of clade 2.2 virus 
infection in sub-Saharan Africa,11 Egypt, and Europe may indicate introduction of 
the virus by wild birds. The risk of the introduction of influenza A (H5N1) viruses 
into North America by birds migrating through Alaska appears to be low.12
Epidemiol o gy of Hum a n Infec tions
Incidence and Demographic Characteristics
Despite widespread exposures to poultry infected with avian influenza A (H5N1) 
viruses,13,14 influenza A (H5N1) disease in humans remains very rare. Since May 2005, 
the numbers of both affected countries13 and confirmed cases of influenza A (H5N1) 
virus infection (340 cases as of December 14, 2007) have increased, in part because 
of the spread of clade 2.2 viruses across Eurasia and to Africa5,15 (Fig. 1 of the Supple-
mentary Appendix, available with the full text of this article at www.nejm.org).
The median age of patients with influenza A (H5N1) virus infection is approxi-
mately 18 years, with 90% of patients 40 years of age or younger and older adults 
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underrepresented.16 The overall case fatality pro-
portion is 61%; it is highest among persons 10 to 
19 years of age and lowest among persons 50 years 
of age or older.16 Whether preexisting immunity, 
differences in exposure, or other factors might 
contribute to the apparently lower frequency of 
infection and lethal illness among older adults is 
uncertain. Most patients with influenza A (H5N1) 
virus infection were previously healthy. Of six af-
fected pregnant women, four have died, and the 
two survivors had a spontaneous abortion.17
Increases in human cases of influenza A (H5N1) 
have been observed during cooler months in as-
sociation with increases in outbreaks among poul-
try (see Fig. 1 of the Supplementary Appendix).18 
However, because cases have occurred year-
round, clinicians must be alert to possible human 
infection at any time, especially in countries with 
outbreaks of influenza A (H5N1) among birds. 
To date, no cases of influenza A (H5N1) illness 
have been identified among short-term travelers 
visiting countries affected by outbreaks among 
poultry or wild birds,19 although clinicians in un-
affected countries should consider this possibility 
in travelers with exposures to poultry.
Surveillance for cases of influenza A (H5N1) 
has focused on patients with severe illness, but 
milder illnesses in children, which are not pneu-
monic,20,21 occur. Limited seroepidemiologic stud-
ies conducted since 2003 involving villagers liv-
ing with backyard poultry, workers in live-poultry 
markets, and health care workers suggest that 
 asymptomatic or mild human influenza A (H5N1) 
virus infection is rare (Table 1 of the Supplemen-
tary Appendix).14
Transmission
Direct avian-to-human H5N1 virus transmission 
is the predominant means of human infection, 
although the exact mode and sites of influenza A 
(H5N1) virus acquisition in the respiratory tract 
are incompletely understood. Handling of sick or 
dead poultry during the week before the onset of 
illness is the most commonly recognized risk 
factor.22,23 Most patients have acquired A (H5N1) 
infection from poultry raised inside or outside 
their houses. Slaughtering, defeathering, or pre-
paring sick poultry for cooking; playing with or 
holding diseased or dead poultry; handling fight-
ing cocks or ducks that appear to be well; and 
consuming raw or undercooked poultry or poul-
try products have all been implicated as potential 
risk factors.21-24 The defeathering of dead wild 
swans was implicated in one case cluster.25
The influenza A (H5N1) virus can also infect 
multiple mammalian hosts,26,27 including domes-
tic cats28 and dogs.29 None have been implicated in 
influenza A (H5N1) virus transmission to humans 
yet, but any animal infected with the virus theo-
retically poses a risk of transmission and of be-
ing a host for viral adaptation to mammals.26
Clusters of human influenza A (H5N1) ill-
ness with at least two epidemiologically linked 
cases have been identified in 10 countries and 
have accounted for approximately one quarter of 
cases.20,21,24,30-32 Most clusters have involved two 
or three persons; the largest affected eight. More 
than 90% of case clusters have occurred among 
blood-related family members, suggesting possi-
ble genetic susceptibility, although one statistical 
model indicated that these clusters might have oc-
curred because of chance alone.33 Most persons 
Figure 1 (facing page). Evolution of the Hemagglutinin 
and Other Key Mutations Associated with Virulence  
or Drug Resistance in Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus.
The phylogenetic tree is for the hemagglutinin gene of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses. 
The geographic distributions refer to avian isolates, 
and the tree is based on publicly available sequences. 
Clade 0 includes viruses that were first recognized to 
cause human infections in Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region in 1997. Viruses from clades and sub-
clades 0, 1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 7 have caused human 
 disease. Clade 1 viruses predominated in Vietnam, 
Thailand, and Cambodia in the early phase of the out-
break (2004–2005), and clade 2.1 viruses are endemic 
in Indonesia. Clade 2.2 viruses were associated with a 
major outbreak of H5N1 disease in migratory birds in 
Qinghai Lake, China, and have since spread, causing 
avian disease in Central and South Asia, the Middle 
East, Europe, and Africa and human disease in western 
Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Clade 2.3 has become 
dominant in southern China and has also been detect-
ed in adjacent countries. (Modified from the WHO 
Web site: www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/
guidelines/nomenclature/en/index.html.) The influenza 
genome contains eight individual segments of RNA, 
several of which encode two proteins. Within clade 1 
or clade 2.1 viruses, polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2) 
Glu627Lys is observed in some isolates of human 
 viruses but not in avian viruses.3 Some human clade 1 
viruses without PB2 627Lys have PB2 701Asn; clade 
2.2 viruses of both human and avian origin have PB2 
Glu627Lys.4 The importance of sequence variations in 
NS1, in which most influenza A (H5N1) viruses contain 
a carboxyl-terminus–sequence motif that mediates 
binding to various cellular proteins bearing a PDZ 
 domain, remains to be determined.
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in case clusters probably acquired infection from 
common-source exposures to poultry, but lim-
ited, nonsustained human-to-human transmis-
sion has probably occurred during very close, un-
protected contact with a severely ill patient.20,30,32 
In the largest cluster, transmission probably oc-
curred from the index case to six blood-related 
family members and subsequently to another fam-
ily member.32 Respiratory secretions and all bodi-
ly f luids, including feces, should be considered 
potentially infectious.
In one quarter or more of patients with influ-
enza A (H5N1) virus infection, the source of ex-
posure is unclear, and environment-to-human 
transmission remains possible.20,24 For some pa-
tients, the only identified risk factor was visiting 
a live-poultry market.34,35 Plausible transmission 
routes include contact with virus-contaminated 
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fomites or with fertilizer containing poultry feces, 
followed by self-inoculation of the respiratory tract 
or inhalation of aerosolized infectious excreta. It 
is unknown whether influenza A (H5N1) virus 
infection can begin in the human gastrointestinal 
tract. In several patients, diarrheal disease pre-
ceded respiratory symptoms,36 and virus has been 
detected in feces.3,37 Acquisition of influenza A 
(H5N1) virus infection in the gastrointestinal tract 
has been implicated in other mammals.26 Drink-
ing potable water and eating properly cooked 
foods are not considered to be risk factors, but 
ingestion of virus-contaminated products or swim-
ming or bathing in virus-contaminated water 
might pose a risk.
Incubation Period
After exposure to infected poultry, the incubation 
period generally appears to be 7 days or less, and in 
many cases this period is 2 to 5 days. In clusters 
in which limited, human-to-human transmission 
has probably occurred, the incubation period ap-
pears to be approximately 3 to 5 days, although in 
one cluster it was estimated to be 8 to 9 days.20,30
Patho genesis
Viral Factors
The viral and host factors that determine host-re-
striction and disease manifestations are incom-
pletely understood.38 Preferential binding of the 
influenza A (H5N1) virus to α2,3-linked sialic acid 
receptors on avian cells39 is thought to be key in 
preventing influenza A (H5N1) and other avian in-
fluenza viruses from readily infecting humans. 
Some influenza A (H5N1) viruses isolated from hu-
mans have acquired mutations that permit binding 
to both α2,3-linked sialic acid receptors and α2,6-
linked sialic acid receptors,40 but these mutations 
appear to be insufficient for efficient human-to-
human transmission. To date, influenza A (H5N1) 
viruses have shown no transmissibility or poor 
transmissibility between ferrets and between swine, 
and reassortment between an influenza A (H5N1) 
virus and an influenza A (H3N2) virus did not con-
fer transmissibility in ferrets.41 Changes in mul-
tiple viral genes are probably required to generate 
a potentially pandemic influenza A (H5N1) virus.
All recent influenza A (H5N1) viruses retain 
a polybasic amino acid motif at the HA1–HA2 con-
necting peptide that is characteristic of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza viruses. Geographic 
variations in this motif have not been associated 
with obvious changes in the virulence of infection 
in humans. Amino acid substitutions in the poly-
merase basic protein 2 (PB2) gene are associated 
with mammalian adaptation, virulence in mice, 
and replication at temperatures present in the 
upper respiratory tract (Fig. 1).42 However, these 
mutations do not correlate with obvious differ-
ences in mortality among humans with this viral 
infection.3,21
Viral Replication
The primary pathologic process that causes death 
is fulminant viral pneumonia. The target cells 
for replication of the influenza A (H5N1) virus 
include type 2 alveolar pneumocytes and macro-
phages.17,43,44 Bronchiolar and alveolar cells, but 
not epithelia from the trachea or upper respiratory 
tract, express detectable α2,3-linked sialic acid re-
ceptors.43-45 However, influenza A (H5N1) viruses 
replicate in ex vivo organ cultures of the upper re-
spiratory tract,44 postmortem studies show virus 
in tracheal epithelia,17,46 and high titers of virus 
are detectable in specimens of throat and tracheal 
aspirates from humans infected with influenza A 
(H5N1) virus.3 These findings suggest that the ini-
tial infection may occur in either the upper or lower 
respiratory tract, although the latter may support 
more efficient replication.
Limited data show that patients with influ-
enza A (H5N1) disease may have detectable viral 
RNA in the respiratory tract for up to 3 weeks, 
presumably because of negligible preexisting im-
munity and possibly viral evasion of immune re-
sponses.3 One patient with fatal infection treated 
with both antiviral agents and corticosteroids 
had viral antigen and RNA in tracheal samples on 
day 27 after the onset of illness.17 Viral loads in 
the pharynx are higher and plasma viral RNA is 
detected more often in patients with fatal disease 
than in those with nonfatal disease, indicating 
that levels of viral replication influence the out-
come.3 The reported presence of infectious virus 
in the blood, cerebrospinal fluid, or viscera of sev-
eral patients with fatal disease indicates that, as 
in birds and several mammalian species, dissemi-
nated infection occurs in some humans.3,17,36,37,46 
A fatal influenza A (H5N1) infection in one preg-
nant woman who received corticosteroids for 
treatment of the disease was associated with vi-
rus infection of the brain, placenta, and fetus.17 
Infectious virus and viral RNA have been detected 
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in feces and intestines, suggesting that the vi-
rus sometimes replicates in the gastrointestinal 
tract.1,3,36,37,46
Pathological Findings
The few reported autopsies of patients with influ-
enza A (H5N1) virus infection have shown diffuse 
alveolar damage with hyaline membrane forma-
tion, patchy interstitial lymphoplasmacytic infil-
trates, bronchiolitis with squamous metaplasia, 
and pulmonary congestion with varying degrees 
of hemorrhage.17,46,47 Acute exudative, diffuse al-
veolar damage with macrophages, neutrophils, and 
activated lymphocytes has been detected in pa-
tients who died within 2 weeks after the onset of 
illness. Apoptosis in alveolar cells and infiltrating 
leukocytes are prominent findings.46 Lymphocyte 
depletion occurs in the spleen, lymph nodes, and 
tonsils; histiocytic hyperplasia and reactive hemo-
phagocytosis presumably result from host cytokine 
responses and viral infection. Edema and degen-
eration of myocytes in the heart and extensive 
acute tubular necrosis in the kidney have been ob-
served.
Host Responses
Higher plasma levels of macrophage and neutro-
phil-attractant chemokines and both proinflam-
matory and antiinflammatory cytokines (interleu-
kin-6, interleukin-10, and interferon-γ) have been 
observed in patients with influenza A (H5N1) vi-
rus infection — particularly in patients with fatal 
infection — than in patients with conventional in-
fluenza.3 Plasma levels of cytokines and chemo-
kines correlate positively with pharyngeal viral 
loads,3 suggesting that these responses are driven 
by high-level viral replication. In vitro experiments 
involving primary human macrophages and lung 
pneumocytes show differential up-regulation of 
multiple cytokines by influenza A (H5N1) virus as 
compared with human influenza viruses,48 indi-
cating that viral hyperinduction probably contrib-
utes to hypercytokinemia.
In mouse models of influenza A (H5N1) virus 
infection, mice with deficient induction of inter-
leukin-6, macrophage inflammatory protein 1α, 
or tumor necrosis factor α or its receptors49,50 
and mice treated with glucocorticoids,50 had sim-
ilar mortality as compared with wild-type ani-
mals; mice without interleukin-1 receptors had 
increased mortality.49 Tissue damage in human 
influenza A (H5N1) disease probably results from 
the combined effects of unrestrained viral infec-
tion and inflammatory responses induced by in-
fluenza A (H5N1) infection. Knowledge of the 
mechanisms of hypercytokinemia is insufficient 
to guide safe, rational immunomodulatory treat-
ment at present.
Cl inic a l Fe at ur es
Currently, illness due to influenza A (H5N1) vi-
ruses typically manifests as severe pneumonia 
that often progresses rapidly to the acute respira-
tory distress syndrome. The time from the onset 
of illness to presentation (median, 4 days) or to 
Table 1. Case Fatality Proportion According to Clade or Subclade and Median Time from Onset of Illness  
to Hospitalization or Death in Patients with Confirmed Influenza A (H5N1) Illness.
Country
Predominant 
Clade or 
Subclade*
Case Fatality 
Proportion
Onset of Illness  
to Hospitalization
Onset of Illness 
to Death
no. of patients/ 
total no. (%) days
no. of 
patients days
no. of 
patients
Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam† 1 66/123 (54) 4 109 9 65
Indonesia 2.1 76/96 (79) 5 64 9 72
Azerbaijan, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, 
Nigeria, Turkey 
2.2 26/59 (44) 3 36 9 24
China, Laos 2.3 17/26 (65) 5 16 10 17
* The presumed clade or subclade assignment is based on the known geographic distribution of the viruses and is not 
verified by individual patient data. Few sequences are available for human isolates in the public database for some 
countries. Multiple clades and subclades have circulated in China in poultry. The numbers of patients for whom data 
were available are listed. The analysis was provided by Dr. Christoph Steffen and Dr. Julia Fitzner, WHO, Geneva.
† Among 61 patients with documented clade 1 infection, the case fatality proportion was 75%; the median time from the 
onset of illness to hospitalization was 5 days in 48 patients, and the median time from the onset of illness to death was 
9 days in 46 patients.
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death (median, 9 to 10 days) has remained un-
changed from 2003 through 2006 (Table 1).16 Ob-
served differences in mortality among patients 
with presumed clade 1 and clade 2 virus infec-
tions (Tables 1 and 2)1,21,24,35,51 are difficult to 
interpret because of variations in medical prac-
tices and the time from the onset of illness to 
treatment among affected countries.
Febrile upper respiratory illnesses without 
pneumonia in children have been reported more 
frequently since 2005.20,21 Early consultation and 
antiviral therapy may have altered the clinical 
course of these illnesses. Less frequent gastroin-
testinal symptoms have been reported since 2005 
(Table 2), suggesting that some manifestations 
of clade 1 and 2 virus infections may differ from 
each other. Leukopenia, lymphopenia, mild-to-
moderate thrombocytopenia, and elevated levels 
of aminotransferases are common but not univer-
sal (Table 2). Lymphopenia and increased levels 
of lactate dehydrogenase at presentation have been 
associated with a poor prognosis.1,3,21,37 Other 
reported abnormalities include elevated levels of 
creatine phosphokinase, hypoalbuminemia, and 
increased d-dimer levels and changes indicative 
of disseminated intravascular coagulopathy.20,21
The nonspecific clinical presentation of influ-
enza A (H5N1) disease has often resulted in mis-
Table 2. Clinical and Common Laboratory Features of Influenza A (H5N1) Disease at Hospital Admission.*
Variable
Vietnam, Thailand, 
Cambodia,  
2004–2005,  
Clade 1†
Indonesia, 
2005–2006, 
Clade 2.1‡
China, 
2005–2006, 
Clade 2.3§
Egypt, 
2006–2007, 
Clade 2.2¶
Turkey, 
Azerbaijan,  
2006, 
Clade 2.2‖
Age — yr     
Median 14–22 18.5 30 12.5 16.5–10.0
Range 2–58 1.5–45.0 12–41 1–75 5–20
Male sex — no./total no. (%) 19/41 (46) 33/54 (61) 3/8 (38) 12/38 (32) 9/16 (56)
Contact with poultry within previous 2 weeks — no./ 
total no. (%)
31/36 (86) 41/54 (76) 8/8 (100)** 31/38 (82) 8/8 (100)††
Time from onset of symptoms to hospitalization — days   
Median 6–8 5 6 3 5–6
Range 3–8  1–14  3–11  0–14 1–12 
Clinical presentation — no./ total no. (%)
Fever 41/41 (100) 54/54 (100) 8/8 (100) 34/38 (89) 15/16 (94)
Dyspnea 33/37 (89) 51/54 (94) 4/8 (50) 14/38 (37) 7/16 (44)
Cough 40/41 (98) 50/54 (93) 7/8 (88) 27/38 (71) 12/15 (80)
Pneumonia 41/41 (100) 54/54 (100) 8/8 (100) 23/38 (61)‡‡ 14/16 (88)
Coryza 9/27 (33) NR NR NR 2/14 (14)
Sore throat 13/41 (32) NR NR 26/38 (68) 14/16 (88)
Vomiting 5/31 (16) 6/54 (11) NR 3/37 (8) 0/7 (0)
Diarrhea 16/31 (52) 6/54 (11) NR 2/37 (5) 4/14 (29)
Depressed consciousness NR NR NR 3/38 (8) 4/8 (50)
Seizures NR 1/54 (2) NR NR 2/7 (29)
Headache 5/14 (36) 7/54 (13) NR 19/38 (50) 7/15 (47)
Conjunctivitis 0/22 (0) NR NR 14/38 (37) 1/8 (12)
Myalgia 11/37(30) 7/54 (13) NR 17/38 (45) 4/15 (27)
Leukopenia 17/22 (77) 41/49 (84) NR 10/37 (27) 11/15 (73)
Lymphopenia 16/24 (67) 16/29 (55) NR 4/25 (16) 7/13 (54)
Thrombocytopenia 13/24 (54) 29/45 (64) NR 8/26 (31) 9/13 (69)
Increased aminotransferase levels 20/28 (71) NR NR 15/27 (56) 6/8 (75)
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diagnosis of subsequently confirmed cases (Ta-
ble 3); influenza A (H5N1) virus infection has been 
suspected in only a small number of patients. 
Health care staff should include influenza A 
(H5N1) virus infection in the differential diagno-
sis for patients who present with epidemiologic 
risk factors and unusual courses of illness, espe-
cially rapidly progressing pneumonia (see Fig. 2 
of the Supplementary Appendix).
L a bor at or y Di agnosis
Detection of viral RNA by means of conventional 
or real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain 
reaction remains the best method for the initial 
diagnosis of influenza A (H5N1).52 These assays 
can provide results within 4 to 6 hours and can 
be performed under biosafety level 2 conditions. 
The genetic variability of influenza A (H5N1) vi-
ruses7,8 calls for frequent updating of primers 
and probes. Consequently, access to sequences 
from recent influenza A (H5N1) viral isolates is 
essential. To detect other influenza A virus infec-
tions and reduce false negative results due to muta-
tions in the H5 hemagglutinin gene, a conserved 
influenza A gene (e.g., matrix or nucleoprotein) 
should also be targeted.
Diagnostic yields are higher with throat spec-
imens than with nasal swabs because of higher 
viral loads of influenza A (H5N1) in the throat.1,3 
However, nasal swabs are useful for detecting 
human influenza viruses, so collection of both 
specimens is recommended. If they are available, 
tracheal aspirates have higher viral titers and yields 
than specimens from the upper respiratory tract.3 
Negative results in single respiratory specimens 
do not rule out influenza A (H5N1) virus infec-
tion,21 and repeated collection of multiple speci-
men types is recommended.52 Previous antiviral 
treatment may reduce the diagnostic yield. Detec-
tion of influenza A (H5N1) viral RNA in feces or 
blood may provide prognostic information,3 but it 
has lower diagnostic sensitivity than influenza A 
(H5N1) viral RNA in respiratory specimens.
Commercially available rapid assays for influ-
enza-antigen detection have poor clinical sensitiv-
ity for the detection of influenza A (H5N1) virus 
(Table 2 of the Supplementary Appendix),1,20,21 
and they do not differentiate between human and 
avian subtypes of influenza A viruses. Although 
rapid antigen tests have similar analytic sensitiv-
ity for detecting human and avian influenza A 
(H5N1) viruses, they require 1000 times higher 
levels of virus than viral cultures to be positive.53
The detection of anti-H5 antibodies is essential 
for epidemiologic investigations and may provide 
retrospective diagnostic confirmation in patients. 
Seroconversion generally occurs 2 to 3 weeks af-
ter infection. Microneutralization assays are the 
most reliable methods for detecting antibodies to 
Table 2. (Continued.)
Variable
Vietnam, Thailand, 
Cambodia,  
2004–2005,  
Clade 1†
Indonesia, 
2005–2006, 
Clade 2.1‡
China, 
2005–2006, 
Clade 2.3§
Egypt, 
2006–2007, 
Clade 2.2¶
Turkey, 
Azerbaijan,  
2006, 
Clade 2.2‖  
Deaths — no./ total no. (%) 32/41 (78) 41/54 (76) 7/8 (88) 15/38 (39) 9/16 (56)
Time from onset of symptoms to death — days    
Median 8–12 9 9 11.5 10–13
Range 4–30 5–19 8–19 6–32 9–17
* The presumed clade or subclade assignment is based on the known geographic distribution of the viruses and is not verified by individual 
patient data. Few sequences are available for human isolates in the public database for some countries. Multiple clades and subclades 
have circulated in China in poultry. NR denotes not reported.
† Data are from the WHO Writing Committee.1
‡ Data are from Sedyaningsih et al.24
§ Data are from Yu et al.35 and Yu et al.51
¶ Data are from Abdel-Ghafar A (unpublished data). The lower mortality among Egyptian patients as compared with Indonesian patients in 
2006–2007 could be related to the approximately 2-day shorter time to presentation and lower frequency of pneumonia among the Egyptian 
patients.
║‖ Data for Turkey are from Oner et al.21 Data for Azerbaijan were provided by the Ministry of Health.
** This number includes six of eight patients who visited live-bird markets but did not have known direct exposure to poultry.
†† Only one of eight patients had contact with poultry in Azerbaijan; exposures were to dead swans.
‡‡ Pneumonia did not develop in 2 of 12 adults (17%) and 13 of 26 children (50%) in Egypt.
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avian viruses, but they are labor-intensive and re-
quire biosafety level 3 facilities and appropriate 
strains of influenza A (H5N1) viruses. As com-
pared with initial samples, elevations of four 
times or more or single titers of 1:80 or more in 
convalescent-phase samples are considered to be 
diagnostic.52 Modified nonpathogenic influenza 
A (H5N1) virus generated by reverse genetics or 
lentivirus pseudotyped with H5 hemagglutinin54 
may provide alternatives for performing neutral-
ization tests in biosafety level 2 facilities. Hemag-
glutination-inhibition assays with the use of horse 
erythrocytes show promising results but require 
further validation.
Tr e atmen t
Antiviral Agents
Susceptibility to current antiviral agents varies 
among circulating strains of influenza A (H5N1) 
viruses. Clade 1 viruses and most clade 2 viruses 
from Indonesia are fully resistant to M2 inhibi-
tors, whereas clade 2 viruses from the lineages in 
other parts of Eurasia and Africa are usually sus-
ceptible (Klimov A: personal communication). As 
compared with influenza A (H5N1) viruses from 
1997 or influenza A (H1N1) viruses in vitro,55 
clade 1 viruses generally show enhanced suscepti-
bility to oseltamivir carboxylate, but the high-
level replication of some oseltamivir-susceptible 
strains requires higher doses or more prolonged 
administration, or both, in animal models.55,56 
Clade 1 viruses appear to be 15 to 30 times more 
sensitive to oseltamivir than clade 2 isolates from 
Indonesia and Turkey,56,57 although the possible 
clinical relevance of such differences in oseltami-
vir susceptibility remains to be determined. Dur-
ing oseltamivir therapy, the emergence of highly 
resistant variants with an H274Y neuraminidase 
mutation may be associated with a fatal outcome.58 
Infection by influenza A (H5N1) viruses contain-
ing an N294S mutation that causes a reduction in 
oseltamivir susceptibility by a factor of 12 to 15 
times was reported to be present in two Egyptian 
patients with fatal disease before therapy,59 and 
avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses with reduced 
susceptibility to neuraminidase inhibitors are oc-
casionally detected.60
Early treatment with oseltamivir is recom-
mended,61,62 and data from uncontrolled clinical 
trials suggest that it improves survival (Table 4), 
although the optimal dose and duration of thera-
py are uncertain. Mortality remains high despite 
administration of oseltamivir; late initiation of 
therapy appears to be a major factor. Uncontrolled 
viral replication, as reflected in the detection of 
persistent pharyngeal RNA after completion of 
standard therapy, is associated with a poor prog-
nosis.58 Higher levels of viral replication and 
slower clearance of infection probably occur in the 
lower respiratory tract.3 The oral bioavailability of 
oseltamivir in patients with severe diarrhea or gas-
trointestinal dysfunction related to influenza A 
(H5N1) virus infection or those in whom the drug 
has been administered extemporaneously (e.g., by 
means of a nasogastric tube) is uncertain.
A higher dose of oseltamivir (e.g., 150 mg twice 
daily in adults) and an increased duration of ther-
apy, for a total of 10 days, may be reasonable, 
given the high levels of replication of the influ-
enza A (H5N1) virus, observations of progressive 
disease despite early administration of standard-
dose oseltamivir (75 mg twice daily for 5 days in 
adults) within 1 to 3 days after the onset of the 
illness, and the proven safety of higher doses in 
adults with seasonal influenza, especially if there 
is pneumonic disease at presentation or evidence 
of clinical progression.62 In mouse models of 
amantadine-sensitive influenza A (H5N1) virus in-
fection, as compared with monotherapy, the com-
bination of oseltamivir and amantadine signifi-
cantly increased survival rates and inhibited viral 
replication in the internal organs.64 No adverse 
pharmacologic interactions have been shown in 
humans.65 In areas where influenza A (H5N1) 
viruses are likely to be susceptible to amantadine, 
Table 3. Initial Diagnosis in Patients with Confirmed Influenza A (H5N1) 
Virus Infection.*
Diagnosis
Indonesia 
(N = 52)
Thailand 
(N = 25)
number (percent)
Pneumonia 24 (46) 11 (44)
Dengue virus infection 6 (12) 4 (16)
Typhoid fever 2 (4) 0 (0)
Upper respiratory illness 14 (27) 4 (16)
Avian influenza 6 (12) 2 (8)
Other 0 (0) 4 (16)†
* Data are from Chotpitayasunondh T and Soeroso S (unpublished data).
† Tuberculosis was diagnosed in one patient, diarrhea in one patient, dizziness 
in one patient, and leptospirosis in one patient.
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combination treatment with oseltamivir would be 
reasonable, especially in seriously ill patients.
Although zanamivir is active against oseltami-
vir-resistant variants with N1 neuraminidase mu-
tations at H274Y66 or N294S, the value of inhaled 
zanamivir has not been studied in human influ-
enza A (H5N1) disease. Suboptimal delivery to 
sites of infection in patients with pneumonic or 
extrapulmonary disease is a concern. Parenteral 
delivery of zanamivir or the neuraminidase inhibi-
tor peramivir results in antiviral activity in ani-
mal models of influenza A (H5N1) virus infec-
tion; these agents and others are under clinical 
development (Table 3 of the Supplementary Ap-
pendix).
Other Treatments
Supportive care with correction of hypoxemia and 
treatment of nosocomial complications remains 
fundamental in the management of influenza A 
(H5N1) disease.2,62 Corticosteroids should not be 
used routinely.62 Corticosteroid therapy has thus 
far not been shown to be effective in patients 
with influenza A (H5N1) virus infection,1 and pro-
longed or high-dose corticosteroid therapy can 
result in serious adverse events, including oppor-
tunistic infections such as central nervous system 
toxoplasmosis (Soeroso S: unpublished data). In 
northern Vietnam, mortality was 59% among 29 
recipients of corticosteroids, as compared with 
24% among 38 persons who did not receive cor-
ticosteroids (P = 0.004) (Cao T, Thanh Liem N: 
personal communication). The possible value of 
other immunomodulators remains to be deter-
mined.
Pr e v en tion
Avian influenza A viruses are readily inactivated 
by a variety of chemical agents and physical con-
ditions, including soaps, detergents, alcohols, and 
chlorination.67,68 Guidelines for the prevention of 
infection with influenza A (H5N1) virus in vari-
ous risk groups, including poultry workers, trav-
elers, and health care workers, are available from 
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion and the WHO.
Antiviral Chemoprophylaxis
WHO guidelines for the use of antiviral agents 
for prophylaxis in persons who have been exposed 
to influenza A (H5N1) viruses in the current pan-
demic-alert period have been published.61 Math-
ematical models of an emerging outbreak of in-
fluenza A (H5N1) in rural Asia predict that a 
strategy of mass, targeted antiviral chemoprophy-
laxis and social-distancing measures might extin-
guish or delay pandemic spread of the virus. The 
WHO has a stockpile of oseltamivir for this pur-
pose and is working with partners for implemen-
tation of its distribution in the event of an out-
break.69
Immunization
Safe and immunogenic inactivated H5 vaccines 
have been developed.6 Reverse genetics permits 
the rapid generation of seed viruses with attenu-
ated virulence, but the changing antigenicity of 
circulating strains of influenza A (H5N1) viruses 
calls for new candidate vaccines from different lin-
eages6 and the development of vaccines that elicit 
cross-clade immunogenicity. H5 hemagglutinin 
appears to be a weak human immunogen. For sub-
virion vaccines without adjuvants, persons who 
have not received a priming dose require two dos-
es with a high hemagglutinin antigen content 
(Table 4 of the Supplementary Appendix). As com-
pared with conventional subunit vaccines, certain 
oil-in-water adjuvant agents6,70,71 or the use of 
whole-virus H5N1 vaccines6,72,73 can substantial-
ly reduce the amount of vaccine antigen required 
to induce immune responses in persons who 
have not received a priming dose, and they can 
induce immune responses to antigenically drift-
ed viruses. However, the specific adjuvant, formu-
lation, dose, stability, and ratio with the antigen 
are important variables that require clinical test-
ing for each candidate vaccine. Alum adjuvants 
have not consistently improved the responses to 
H5 vaccines,6,73,74 whereas certain proprietary ad-
juvants (e.g., MF59 and AS03) appear to be high-
ly effective and allow for considerable antigen-
sparing and cross-reactive antibody responses.6,70,71 
These adjuvants have also been associated with 
increased rates of local and sometimes systemic 
reactogenicity.
The antibody levels required for protection 
against human influenza A (H5N1) illness are 
unclear. The durability of antibody responses is 
limited, but boosting with a homologous vaccine70 
or virus vaccine with viral antigen from another 
clade75 appears to be effective in persons who have 
received two priming doses. Prepriming might al-
low single doses of a homologous vaccine to be 
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sufficient for an antigenically drifted pandemic 
virus. However, decisions regarding the use of vac-
cine before a pandemic and stockpiling require 
complex risk–benefit and cost–benefit analyses 
that include effects on the seasonal capacity of 
vaccine production, because the timing and cause 
of the next influenza pandemic are unknown, and 
it is unclear whether immunization of large popu-
lations could have adverse consequences.
Initial studies in children and elderly persons 
suggest that antibody responses to subvirion vac-
cines at high doses (45 or 90 μg) are similar to 
those in young adults. Approximately 15 to 20% 
of older adults have some baseline neutralizing 
antibodies to H5N1 virus and may have a response 
to a single dose.6 The mechanisms leading to these 
antibodies are uncertain. Other studies to date 
have shown that intradermal H5 vaccines at low 
doses are poorly immunogenic and may be asso-
ciated with injection-site reactions.6 Intranasal live 
attenuated H5 vaccines are highly effective in 
animal models,76 but they show a variable ability 
to replicate in humans and to induce immune re-
sponses. Various investigational approaches, in-
cluding conserved antigen vaccines, vectored H5 
vaccines, and other adjuvants, are being ex-
plored.
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